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This  paper  examines  the  role  of  male-dominated  international  migration  in  shaping  labor 
market  outcomes  by  gender  in  migrant-sending  households  in  Albania.  Using  detailed 
information on family  migration experience from the latest  Living Standards Measurement 
Study  (LSMS)  survey,  we  find  that  male  and  female  labor  supplies  respond  differently  to 
current  and  past  migration  episodes  of  household  members.  Controlling  for  the  potential 
endogeneity of migration and for the income (remittances) effect, estimates show that having a 
migrant abroad decreases female paid labor supply while increasing unpaid work. On the other 
hand, women with past family migration experience are significantly more likely to engage in 
self-employment and less likely to supply unpaid work. The same relationships do not hold for 
men. These findings suggest that over time male-dominated Albanian migration may lead to 
women’s empowerment in the access to income-earning opportunities at origin.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a general consensus that international labor migration entails big socio-economic changes in 
source communities. At the same time, there is an intimate and unexplored relationship between gender 
aspects of migration, such as male-dominated migration, and economic development in countries of 
origin. This paper addresses this issue by looking at the impact of international migration on labor 
supply by gender in such a setting as Albania, where male-migration is an ordinary and widespread 
phenomenon.  
Most  studies  of  the  impact  of  migration  on  source  households  have  overlooked  that  expanding 
opportunities  for  migration  will  have  a  different  effect  on  behavioural  patterns  across  household 
members left behind, beyond increasing the amount of income received by the family (see Chen 2006 
for an exception). The economic impact of migration on non-migrant employment patterns has been 
documented for a few developing economies (Funkhouser, 1992; Tiongson, 2001; Amuedo-Dorantes 
and  Pozo,  2006)  but  while  much  of  the  focus  has  been  on  the  income  effect  of  remittances,  less 
attention has been paid to the role of (male) migration in shifting (female) decision-making power in the 
family at origin. Theoretical analysis suggests that due to imperfect monitoring on the one hand, and 
increase  in  the  household  income  (through  remittances)  on  the  other,  male  migration  may  lead  to 
women bargaining empowerment in the control and allocation of resources at origin - so that gender 
differentials in labour supply may be observed (Chen 2006, Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Haddad et al. 
1997). 
We consider this question by analysing differences in labor market outcomes across men and women in 
Albania according to their family exposure to international migration. Over the last fifteen years this 
country has experienced massive migrant outflows, mainly to Greece and Italy, driven by economic 
hardships during the transition process and fostered by geographic proximity. While we have some 
insights  into  the  welfare  impact  of  migration  and  remittances  on  average  household  income  and 
investment at origin (MacCarthy et al., 2007; Zezza et al. 2005), little is known about the effects on the 
local labor market behavior by gender. There is some evidence on the labour market performance of 
return migrants in Albania (De Coulon and Piracha, 2003) but an unexplored issue is whether the male-
dominated nature of Albanian international migration affects the economic performance of women left 
behind. 
Based  on  unusually  detailed  data  on  household  migration  status  of  current  and  former  household 
members  from  the  2005  Albania  Living  Standards  Measurement  Survey,  this  study  provides  new 
empirical evidence on the gender differential in the home-labor-market impact of heterogeneous family 
migration exposure. Following Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, (2006), we further distinguish between 
paid and unpaid work, in order to test whether the ‘quality’ of women’s work varies according to the 
migration status of their household and at the same time, to account for the important role played by the 
informal  sector  in  (female)  employment  outcomes  in  developing  economies.  Since  households  are 
likely to self-select into sending migrants abroad based in part on unobserved characteristics, we use an   3 
instrumental variable strategy to estimate labour market outcomes by gender in either paid and unpaid 
sector. 
From a policy perspective, exploring the impact of Albania’s out-migration on employment outcomes 
in the country sheds light on migrants’ contributions to household welfare and economic growth at 
origin.  Policy  implications  are  even  more  relevant  if  there  is  a  linkage  between  male-dominated 
migration and a process of gender empowerment at origin – defined as the ability of women to access to 
local earning opportunities. This is so as a more efficient allocation of women’s skills in the labor 
market is largely recognized to be a building block in the development process of both rich and low-
income countries, and higher female labor force participation is found to reduce poverty and improve 
living  standards  among  women  and  future  generations.  (Duflo,  2005,  2003,  Thomas,  1990).  By 
exploring the effect of such a key factor of modernization as economic migration on women’ and men’s 
labor  supply,  this  paper  also  contributes  to  the  broader  literature  on  the  impact  of  economic 
development on gender equity and female living conditions (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006).    
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  sets  out  the  analytical  framework,  the 
background  literature and the  context  of  our  investigation.  Section  3  presents  data and  descriptive 
statistics  whilst  Section  4  illustrates  the  empirical  strategy.  Section  5  and  6  report  the  results  and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background: migration and female labor supply 
Migration  strongly  suggests  the  interdependence  of  work  decisions  within  a  family.  Theoretical 
research,  supported  by  empirical  evidence,  has  shifted  its  view  of  migration  from  an  individual 
decision-making process to a mutually interdependent decision within the family, intended to manage 
uncertainty, diversify the income portfolio and alleviate liquidity constraints (Stark, 1991, Yang and 
Choi 2007, Mendola 2008). Thus, migrant (both temporary and permanent) and non-migrant household 
members  jointly  decide  about  migration  and  act  collectively  to  allocate  resources  by  maintaining 
cooperation over distance or by eventually returning home. It is not clear, though, how this cooperation 
operates within families, and whether dispatching members to other places of employment has different 
effect in the time allocation of individuals at home. To what extent male and female labor supply is 
affected by family migration experience? In particular, does male-dominated migration have any effect 
on women’s employment status at origin? 
Theoretical  analysis  suggests  that  there  are  different  mechanisms,  related  to  time  and  resource 
allocation, through which labor mobility of household members can affect employment outcomes of 
people left behind. Indeed, both the absence of the migrant and the flow of remittances may affect the 
labor supply of the family at origin. Though, much of the emphasis in this literature has been put on the 
role of remittances in lifting budget constraints, raising reservation wages and, through the neoclassical 
income effect, reducing employment at home. Funkhouser (1992) in Managua and Tiongson (2001) in 
Manila, for example, find that remittances have a negative impact on the decision to work of individuals   4 
at  origin,  consistently  with  the  extensive  theory  and  evidence  on the  positive  impact  of  non-labor 
earnings on individual consumption of leisure (Funkehouser 1992 finds a slightly positive impact on 
self-employment though). Hanson (2005) examines the labor market impact of emigration from Mexico 
and find that both men and women are less likely to participate in the labor force if their household 
either  has  sent  migrants  abroad  or  received  remittances  from  abroad.  Amuedo-Dorantes  and  Pozo 
(2006)  instead,  show  that  in  Mexico  the income  effect  of remittances  is at work  in  reshaping  the 
allocation of male and female labor supply across different types of employment, rather than decreasing 
overall labor force participation. 
Nonetheless, remittances receipt is an outcome of household members’ out-migration, which entails the 
re-allocation of time and resources by individuals left behind. On this side, migration has been typically 
conceived as having a ‘disruptive effect’ in terms of loss of working-aged household members to be 
replaced or compensated by household members left behind (Hanson, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2006). Yet, in a traditional society the absence of one household member may also entail a 
bargaining empowerment in decision making within the household at origin, challenging traditional 
gender roles, for example, and ultimately influencing the final allocation of resources.
1 Sociologists 
have  long  emphasized  that  male  migration  may  leave  women  at  origin  with  a  greater  burden  of 
responsibility but also with higher decision-making power and economic independence (Gulati, 1987, 
De Haan, 2000). In research on household power within both industrialized and developing countries, 
wage income and family influence are closely linked, thus pointing to the importance of assessing 
women’s employment opportunities (e.g. Boserup 1970; Blumberg 1984 in Schultz, 1990).
2  
Overall, there has been a strong and growing interest in the determinants of female labor outcomes,  
showing that human capital and family characteristics are important factors behind gender employment 
differentials (see Pissarides et al. 2005). In particular, family membership and its obligations are very 
important correlates of the level of women’s labor supply, but little is known on female labor force 
response to one of the major modern obligations a family has to face, that is dispatching a household 
member (frequently the husband or the son) to work abroad. 
Several examples exist in developing countries on the correlation between male-dominated migration 
and the feminisation of agricultural labor on the one hand, or the urban poverty of female-headed 
households left behind on the other (e.g. Agesa and Kim, 2001; Katz, 2003). Yet, as mentioned above, 
migration also affects the intra-household division of rights and responsibilities, and gender is one of 
the main axes around which this occurs. From a perspective of a time allocation model, when men are 
absent female stayers may have to compensate for that and re-allocate their available time for work and 
                                                 
1 Indeed, failure to recognize the existence of the impact of both migration and remittances on labor supply at home is retained 
as non-problematic by assuming that the sum of the two opposing effects still shows the dominant impact (Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo, 2006). Yet, as argued in the text, the effect of migration itself is not necessarily negative and moreover, a remittance 
is a necessary but insufficient condition to observe migration (measurement error). 
2 We are here concerned with gender inequalities in household power – defined as the degree to which a family member can 
influence important decision within the family. Obtaining a job for wage outside of the family contributes to women’s control 
over the returns to their labor, hence augments their relative power in the allocation of household economic resources (Kabeer, 
2000).   5 
for child caring (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006). From an intra-household bargaining framework, though, 
they may take over a more central role in family budgeting, by gaining control over resources and 
administrating them as to give priority to maximize returns of their individual labor inputs, for example 
(Chen, 2006).
3 In general, even if (male) migration drain off household adults and increases income 
through remittances, the ultimate impact on sending households may be channeled through a change in 
the bargaining process amongst individuals left behind. Thus, the migration impact is not unambiguous 
a priori and, likewise, treating household out-migration and remittance receipt as indistinguishable will 
deliver a blurred picture of their net effects on household members left behind. 
Unlike  other  studies,  we  further  account  for  potential  heterogeneous  effects  of  temporary  and 
permanent migration experience by distinguishing between migrant members currently away from past 
migrants returned home (although some may be migrating again in the future). This is important in 
order to reduce potential migration measurement error and to account for the multifaceted nature (e.g.  
timing) and consequences of migration (e.g. Mendola, 2008; Rodriguez and Tiongson, 2001). Indeed, 
neglecting the coexistence of different forms of migration, such as temporary and permanent migration, 
for example, and the potential correlation between them, can exaggerate or diminish the effect of having 
a migrant as part of the household.
4 
Finally, while analysing female labour choices, it is important to note that women in developing and 
transition countries are economically active when providing unpaid work on the family farm or in a 
small family-run business (Paci 2002; Hill, 1989).
5 Indeed, important contributions on female work 
choice have suggested that, differently from well developed labor markets, the composition of the labor 
force in developing economies has to take into account the importance of both unpaid work and/or the 
informal sector.
6 The decision to enter the labor force as an employee is distinct from the choice to enter 
as  a  family  worker  because  of  wage  differentials,  formal  sector  constraints  in  terms  of  working 
schedules or fixed costs (e.g. commuting time or child care), and individual preferences for economic 
autonomy (Hill, 1989).
 7  Yet, a persistent gap in the literature on women’s employment is that informal 
                                                 
3 There is an important body of literature pointing out that empowered women shift household decision away from their 
husband’s preferences, chaining the choice that are made for children also (see Thomas, 1990; Behrman, 1997; Dulfo, 2003) 
4We are able to distinguish permanent from temporary migrants but clearly any migration decision is not irrevocable so that a 
permanent migrant may decide to return at some point in the future, while a current household member with past migration 
experience may decide to migrate permanently at some time in the future. The issue is particularly thorny for current and most 
recent migrants who may still be in the process of making a final decision on where to settle indefinitely. Actually, the form of 
migration truly permanent in nature typically results in family migration in Albania, which means that these ‘permanent’ 
migrants are unlikely to be present in our sample.  
5 Many works in the literature assume that women reported in self-employed or as unpaid family workers are engaged in the 
‘informal’ sector of the labor market. Our data allow us to differentiate between paid self-employment and unpaid work so that 
we assume that the latter only is ‘informal’ (even though we are aware that many forms of paid self-employment are also 
informal, in the sense of unregistered). 
6 Schultz’s seminal work (1990) emphasised the diversity in low-income countries in what women do, but since then there is 
still little consensus on how female roles are changing today. Schulz made the point that economic development leads to a 
change  in  the  composition  of  the  labor  force  from  a  high  proportion  of  informal  labor  market  employments  to  a  high 
proportion of formal labor market empoloyment (Tiefenthaler, 1994). 
7 As pointed out by Schultz (1990), women are more likely to work in the family or informal labor market if the labor costs to 
firms exceed the opportunity costs of female labor to family enterprises. Firms are at a relative disadvantage compared with 
families in the employment of less experienced and less skilled labor. Edwards and Field-Hendrey (2002) focus specifically on 
the site of work and show that, even in the U.S., home-based work is an attractive option for women for whom the fixed costs 
of work are high.    6 
and unpaid work are largely undocumented and unquantified, whilst a disaggregated picture of female 
work by its nature and ‘quality’ is likely to provide a more precise employment pattern, especially in a 
developing or transition economy (Paci, 2002; Lim 1996, Mehra and Gammage, 1999).
8 Thus, we 
account for the heterogeneity of female labor market constraints by distinguishing paid from unpaid 
work. Overall, it is well known that male and female family decision-makers have different preferences, 
but it is an open question how massive emigration in a traditional society affects the value of time and 
the ownership of an income stream by gender.  
 
2.1. The Albanian context 
Albania is a particularly interesting setting where to study the impact of migration on domestic (formal 
and informal) labor market by gender. This country has been largely affected by the passage on the 
market economy at the beginning of 1990 and key changes over the process have occurred in the local 
labor market. Like in many other transition economies, the country experienced a substantial decline 
and stagnation in labor force participation in the new labor market. Public sector employment has 
declined enormously during the transition period but job growth in the private sector has been too slow 
to compensate (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Albanian labor market trends (Source: ILO LABORSTA) 
 
According to INSTAT data, private sector employment increased by only 23,000 between 2001 and 
2004, adding only 2.5% to total employment in this period (WB, 2006). Two main implications of this 
situation are the migration of a lot of young men to work abroad and the large withdrawals of women 
                                                 
8 From a perspective of a time allocation model, labor supply (the allocation of leisure) is an indirect measure of individual 
consumption. However, the impossibility to distinguish leisure from other non-market time (e.g. home production or unpaid 
labor), is a shortcoming of most studies, which therefore assume that a person’s utility is increasing in all non-market time 
(including unpaid work).   7 
from the labor market
9. The consequential under-valuation of women’s time has resulted in significant 
differences in the time male and female groups allocate to paid and unpaid work (with women spending 
an inefficiently high proportion of their time in household production and caring activities, while men 
overspecialize  in  labor  market  activities)  (Paci,  2002).  While  female  represent  at  least  half  of  the 
population in Albania, they account for the 40 percent of the total labor force and face higher rates of 
unemployment than men (ILO, 2001).
10 
Driven by economic hardships and geographic proximity, Albania has developed strong migration ties 
with other labor markets, in particular Greece and Italy, and remittances play a significant role in 
Albanian economy (Coulon and Piracha, 2005; Carletto et al. 2007). Much of migration from Albania 
shows a stable and common pattern in that it has traditionally been temporary in nature (particularly the 
flow to the neighboring Greece), whether seasonal or circular. The limited empirical evidence available 
seems to suggest the existence of a “migration cycle”, involving multiple migration episodes prior to 
settling, very often back in the source country (Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou, 2006).   
Overall, the high incidence of the informal sector, the intensity of migration flows, the high rate of 
hidden unemployment in agriculture sector and the significant number of unemployed that are not 
registered in the public employment service, makes difficult to have a real evaluation of the labor 
market situation of the country over the last 17 years (see ILO Report 2001). Using detailed micro-data 
collected  through  household  questionnaires,  we  provide  new  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of 
international migration on the local male and female labor supply in Albania. If engagement in earning 
activities is the result of all economic policies and social processes, it is of interest to empirically 
investigate the impact  of massive  male-dominated migration  on female  employment  status  in both 
formal and informal sector in Albania.   
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis  
The analysis in this paper is based on the 2005 Albania Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 
survey carried out by the Albania Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) with technical assistance from the 
World Bank. Unlike other household surveys, the latter provides unusually detailed information on 
migration of both current and former household members from Albania to foreign countries. Moreover, 
Albania LSMS includes information on individual labor market status along with a wide range of 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics at household and individual level. 
A total of 3640 households were interviewed, corresponding to a nationally representative sample of 
17,302 individuals, 63 percent (9,742) of which are in working age (i.e. 16-64 years old). Included in 
our analysis are all working-age  men and women  who are not in school, in retirement and in the 
                                                 
9 For an in-depth analysis of the mass Albanian migration since 1990, see King, et al. (2005). 
10 Between 1980 and 2004, female labor force participation in Albania has not increased much (from 39% to 42%) (see WB 
GenderStats at http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats). This rather stable trend challenges the argument that female labor 
supply in migrant households may be explained by the aggregate national shift toward more working women in the economy.    8 
military service.
11 Identification of paid and unpaid workers is derived from answers to the ‘job status’ 
question (no. 07- mod. 4C) according to which paid employment and self-employment refer to self-
reported wage and salary work (as employee, paid worker, employer, worker on own account) either 
on- or off-farm, whereas unpaid work refers to work performed outside the home (either on- or off-
farm) without a corresponding salary.
12 
Concerning  migration,  we  can  distinguish  between  ‘current’  and  ‘past’  international  migration 
exposure,  where current migrants are  all those  former  household  members  no  longer living  in the 
household and currently abroad. Conversely, past migrants are household members who self-report 
their emigration episodes (for a duration of at least one month since they turned 16 years old), and they 
have now returned to live in the household (although they may be migrating again in the future). We 
restrict  our  sample  to  individuals  who left later  than  1990  (even though those  reporting their first 
migration episode before 1990 are only a handful as, prior to that year, migration was legally banned). 
We distinguish between these two forms of migration experience, as there are important differences to 
highlight. As past migrants are concerned, it should be noted that migration from Albania (particularly 
the flow to the neighboring Greece
13) has been traditionally temporary in nature, whether seasonal or 
circular. This entails that migrants move more than once in their life cycle, especially to neighboring 
countries. In our sample households, temporary migrants are mostly men returning from nearby Greece 
and Italy, where agriculture or construction sectors appears to be the main forms of occupation for these 
individuals. In Figure 2 we plot sample migration levels by gender, namely the incidence of self-
reported most recent migration episode by year of migration in 1990-2003, and the male-dominated 
nature of migration waves is striking.
14 Most of these sample migrants did not migrate with spouse in 
the last migration episode (nor with children) (only around 15% do so) and when asked about their 
intention to migrate again, almost 40 percent give a positive answer while 16 percent is uncertain- 
supporting the trend of individual multiple migration episodes
15. Female migration rate is much lower 
relative to men, and most of them (almost 70 percent) leave to Greece to work as domestic and related 
helpers (the remaining sub-group migrate as tie-migrant or to work in agriculture).
16 
 
                                                 
11 We do so as to isolate the labor market effect of migration from the effect on human capital accumulation. The main sample 
restriction is to include only working age population available for work and not in the position to provide ‘voluntary’ work in 
their spare time from their main occupation. Yet, in order to account for the potential interaction between migration and 
individual age, we also performed robustness checks using workers in different age ranges (see below). 
12 We defined unemployed as the working age population without a work and seeking work, or not seeking work due to the 
following  reasons:  (a)  tired/believe  no  work  available  (i.e,  discouraged  workers);  (b)  awaiting  results  of  previous  job 
applications; (c) temporary absent from a permanent job (illness, bad weather etc.); and (e) waiting for rehire/job recall.  
13  Compared  to  Italy,  the  process  of  obtaining  legal  status  in  Greece  is  more  difficult  for  Albanian  migrants,  as  family 
reunification has been discouraged and migrant regularization has been slower (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). In this respect, it 
should not be surprising that particularly the flow to Greece has been more temporary in nature. 
14  The  same  gender  migration  pattern  (i.e.  male  domination)  is  evident  when  plotting  the  self-reported  first  episodes  of 
international migration. As people in Albania are likely to migrate more than once in their life course, the actual survey 
questions on (the timing of) migration are: “In what year and month did you most recently migrate abroad for at least one 
month?” and “In what year was the first time you ever migrated abroad, after having turned 15?”. In both cases migrants are 
almost exclusively male, and the fact that the overtime trend is not changing much is even more relevant for our analysis. 
15 This is consistent with the IOM and Eurobarometer evidence reported by de Coulon and Piracha (2003) that migrants from 
Albania  fall  into  the  category  of  temporary  workers  (see  also  Papapanagos  and  Sanfey,  1998).  Furthermore,  using  same 
Albanian data Kilic at al. (2007) show that among past migrants, most recent returnees with fewer migration episodes are those 
most likely to migrate again, supporting the idea of the ‘migration cylcle’.  









































Figure 2. Most recent migration episodes by year and gender 
 
Current international migrants, on the other hand, are household members who have moved abroad 
more  than  12  months  prior  the  survey,  and  whose  characteristics  are  collected  through  proxy 
respondents  within  the  household.  Importantly,  the  survey  limits  this  group  to  ‘core’  household 
members, i.e. sons and daughters of household head and/or his/her spouse and the spouse him/herself, if 
abroad.
17 Overall, while past international migration shows a rather stable and common pattern, the 
category of current migrants includes a more heterogeneous set of people, including both those who 
will be back home soon (as temporary or return migrants) and those who will be permanently living 
away  from  home  (either  with  or  without  the  rest  of  the  household).
  Overall,  current  migrants  are 
younger, include a higher share of females than it is the case for temporary migration and on average 
belong to relatively better off households than those with past migration experience only.  
Bearing  these  differences  in  mind,  the  potential  impact  of  experiencing  international  migration  is 
substantial in terms of the financial and human capital household members may receive back, both 
affecting their occupation and investment opportunities before and upon return. In particular, the current 
absence of recent migrants may lead to an intra-household call for labor compensation, while past 
migration of household members may entail the return of both human and physical capital to be re-
allocated  or  invested  by  household  members,  depending  on  individual  intra-household  bargaining 
power. Yet, these effects may differ according to whether individuals have themselves worked abroad 
at least once in their life, so that we further distinguish for having a direct migration experience (albeit 
the latter is less relevant for women)
18. 
Table  1  report  individual  characteristics  by  gender  and  household  direct  and  indirect  migration 
experience. The latter is detected in terms of the presence of any current international migrant in the 
household (who left the country more than 12 months prior the survey) and past migration either of 
                                                 
17 Due to data limitations, we are not able to perfectly match wives and migrant husbands or sons. 
18 We will use interchangeably ‘past individual migration’ or ‘direct migration experience’ to refer to the individual response 
to one’s own migration experience, and with ‘past migration of household members’ or ‘indirect migration experience’ to refer 
to the individual response to international migration of someone else in the household.   10 
respondent himself or of someone else in the household.  
 
TABLE 1: Individual characteristics and migration experience by gender 
  Total Population  Working age population 
a 
  Male   Female  Total  Male   Female  Total 
Individual characteristics:              
Married (%)  0.62***  0.59***  0.61  0.68**  0.70**  0.69 
Single (%)  0.36***  0.30***  0.33  0.31***  0.25***  0.28 
Age – Years  32.50**  33.32**  32.92  37.98***  36.99***  37.46 
Household size  4.9  4.91  4.9  4.8  4.76  4.78 
# of children (age<15)  1.32***  1.39***  1.36  1.03***  1.09***  1.06 
Years of education  8.21***  7.62***  7.9  9.90***  9.35***  9.62 
Migration status 
b:             
Current migrants in the hh (%)  0.27***  0.30***  0.28  0.28***  0.33***  0.30 
Past indiv.migration (%)  0.23***  0.03***  0.13  0.27***  0.03***  0.15 
Past migration of hh members (%)  0.13***  0.28***  0.21  0.12***  0.32***  0.23 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: (a) Persons aged 16 to 64 year. (b) The last 3 binary variables capturing migration experience are respectively: (i) individual has at 
least one household member currently migrated abroad; (ii) individual has migrated abroad at least once; (iii) individual has never migrated 
abroad but someone else in his/her household did at least once.   
 
Figures  show  that  28  percent  of  the  total  sampled  individuals  has  at  least  one  migrant  household 
member currently living abroad and there is a small but significant difference between women and men 
(higher in magnitude if we consider working age population only, i.e. persons aged 16 to 64 years old). 
On average, 13 percent of the sample has migrated abroad at least once (since turned 16 years old), the 
vast majority of which are male (only 3 percent of female report having migrated abroad).
19 On the 
contrary, 28 percent of women report having experienced international migration through someone else 
in the household, whilst a halved percentage of male report having a household member  migrated 
abroad  in  the  past.  Both  last  figures  are  consistent  with  the  anecdotic  argument  that  Albanian 
international migration has been widely male-dominated.   
In Table 2 we present some individual demographic characteristics of the working age population of 
Albania differentiated by direct or indirect migration experiences. People having current international 
migrants in their family are mainly female, above 40 years old, with smaller household size (likely as a 
result of migration itself), grown-up children, and lower education than the remaining sample. This is 
consistent with the idea that these are parents of (educated) grown-up children who have migrated 
permanently most likely with their new family.  
People with individual past foreign experience, are mainly young males, married and with an average 
level of education higher than those who never migrated in their adult life. Among individuals with 
household  members  migrated  abroad  (at  least  once)  in  the  past,  most  of  them  are  female  (74%), 
younger than the others (around 36 years old), with bigger households and a lower level of education. 
 
                                                 
19 The vast majority (82%) of households with past migration experiences, have had only 1 member abroad. This suggests that 
temporary migration is generally taken up by only one household member, mostly the male household head.   11 
 TABLE 2: Individual characteristics by international migration experience (working age pop.
 a) 
  Current migrants in the hh  Past migration 




hh members  
Female (%)  0.50***  0.56***  0.54***  0.11***  0.74*** 
Married (%)  0.69  0.68  0.66***  0.79***  0.69 
Age – Years  35.95***  40.93***  38.11***  37.05  35.94*** 
Household size 
b  5.00***  4.27***  4.58***  4.79  5.33*** 
# of children (age<15)  1.24***  0.66***  0.99***  1.22***  1.15*** 
Years of education  9.81***  9.17***  9.67**  10.21***  9.09*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: (a) Persons aged 16 to 64 year. (b) Household members here are only those currently living at home (i.e. current 
international migrants are not considered as household members). 
 
Table  3  presents  the  employment  rate  of  the  working  age  population  by  gender
20,  differentiating 
between wage employment, paid self-employment and unpaid work.  Working women appear to be 
more concentrated in unpaid jobs, followed by wage- and self-employment. Differentiating by sector, 
our data report women more concentrated in the unpaid agricultural sectors and paid non-agricultural 
sector, followed by self-employment (very few women work as agricultural wage workers). 
 
TABLE 3: Average labor outcomes by gender (% of working age pop.
 a) 
  Male  Female  Total 
Unemployed  0.14***  0.19***  0.16 
Wage employee (paid)  0.43***  0.24***  0.35 
Self employed (paid)  0.23***  0.12***  0.18 
Unpaid workers  0.21***  0.44***  0.31 
By sector:       
Employee agriculture  0.03***  0.00***  0.02 
Employee non-agr.  0.39***  0.24***  0.33 
Self-employed agr.  0.08***  0.06***  0.07 
Self-employed non-agr.  0.15***  0.06***  0.11 
Unpaid worker agr.  0.19***  0.38***  0.27 
Unpaid worker non-agr.  0.02***  0.06***  0.04 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: (a) Persons aged 16 to 64 year.  
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution densities for log labor hours supplied in the last week by gender and 
type of work. Men report higher hours of work in wage employment and self-employment while the 
opposite is true for women in unpaid work.  
Table 4 present labor force participation rates - in both paid-formal and unpaid-informal jobs - and 
migration experience by gender. Overall, the gender employment gap, defined as the difference in the 
employment rate between men and women, is around 29% if we consider paid work only, and around 
6%  if  we  take  into  account  unpaid  work  as  well.  When  we  consider  people  having  experienced 
migration, though, the gender gap significantly decreases, mostly because of an increase in the female 
employment rate. If persons have one current international migrant in their family, the gender gap is   12 
28%, whilst if they experienced migration either directly or through another household member the 
gender employment gap is respectively 22% and 16%. In case of past migration of others, though, 
employment rates decrease both for males and females, suggesting that those who stay behind are either 
more likely or more willing to withdraw from the labor market (men relatively more than women).  
Moreover, the paid plus unpaid employment rate decreases in all cases but for return migrants: women 
upon return are significantly less engaged in unpaid work and more in paid employment (this sub-group 







































































Figure 3.  Hours of work distribution, by type of work and gender 
 
 
TABLE 4: Employment rate and gender gap by migration experience (% of working age pop.)
 a 
  Total  Men  Women  Gender Gap
b 
All           
   Paid employment rate  0.53  0.65  0.36  0.29*** 
   Unpaid employment rate  0.31  0.21  0.44  -0.23*** 
Current migrants in the hh         
   Paid employment rate  0.47  0.60  0.32  0.28*** 
   Unpaid employment rate  0.37  0.24  0.50  -0.26*** 
Past indiv.migration         
   Paid employment rate  0.67  0.68  0.46  0.22*** 
   Unpaid employment rate  0.18  0.17  0.23  -0.06*** 
Past migration of hh members         
   Paid employment rate  0.35  0.47  0.31  0.16*** 
   Unpaid employment rate  0.49  0.39  0.53  -0.14 *** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: (a) Persons aged 16 to 64 years. (b) The difference in the employment rate between men and women. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
20 The whole analysis has been conducted also considering as working age females the sub-sample of women with age between 
16 and 59. Results do not change significantly.   13 
In summary, the descriptive statistics show the importance of international out-migration in Albania, its 
male-dominated nature and the multi-faceted dimension in terms of potential migrants selection and 
implications for household members left behind. Migration rate of women is very thin while one third 
of female population experienced migration of other household members. It is of interest to better 
understand  the  relationship  between  this  male-dominated  migration  and  a  process  of  ‘gender 
empowerment’ - through the access to local labor earnings. From key descriptive findings, indirect 
migration experiences seem to lead to a narrowing of the gender employment gap, mostly due to an 
increase in labor supply of women with family  migration experience. Yet, it should be noted that 
different migration categories are not mutually exclusive at household level and a multivariate analysis 
taking into account the concurrent effect of the latter and further variables on the individual labor 
market behavior is required. 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
The theory on labor supply indicates that workers’ leisure-work preferences may not be separable from 
labor supply of other family members. International migration affects the labour supply of non-migrants 
in two main ways: the absence of the migrant and the flow of remittances. Both features of migration 
may entail either a greater independence in the management of the household economy at home (e.g. 
bargaining  empowerment  in  decision-making)  or  a  greater  reliance  on  migrants’  outcomes  (e.g. 
consumption of leisure and remittances as non-labor income).  
In order to test the migration- home-labor-market linkages, we model participation in the labour force 
by gender and predict the employment outcomes according to migration experience and remittances. To 
do so we use a discrete occupational choice model based on the extensive theoretical literature on labor 
market behavioural models (see Moffitt, 1999; Killinsworth and Heckman 1986 for a review). 
According to these models, family member decisions about leisure times and labor supply are affected 
by  other  members’  behaviour  through  cross-substitutions  and  income  effects.  While  the  latter  is 
expected to have a negative effect on labor supply (particularly for women; see Altonji and Blank, 
1999),  the  signs  of  the  former  are  unknown  depending  on  both  individual  bargaining  power  and 
whether household members’ work are complements or substitutes.
21 Hence, it is not clear a priori 
whether (male-dominated) migration impact in terms of female labor force participation will result in an 
increase or reduction of the gender employment gap (see also Pissarides et al. 2005 on female labor 
literature). 
                                                 
21  In a unitary household model, with the family as one decision making unit (e.g. the household head), signs of cross-
substitution effects are unknown, while the magnitudes are symmetric. In the bargaining model of family behaviour, that treat 
the decision of individual family members in game-theoretic terms, both signs and magnitudes are unknown, depending on the 
individual  bargaining  power.  Within  the  family  experiencing  migration,  for  example,  differences  in  the  distribution  by 
recipient (husband, wife etc) of exogenous income may lead to differences in their bargaining strengths and, hence, their 
behaviour so that each individual family members exogenous income appears as separated argument in each demand equation 
(for leisure times and consumption). The empirical difficulty is having exact measures of certain variables that play a key role 
in bargaining models. Here we do not have exogenous income flows that are under the control of particular family members- 
but  we  have  migration  as  a  source  of  expanding  opportunities  and  explore  if  there  are  gender  effect  in  the  individual 
behavioural responses.   14 
We model labor outcomes of working age population as a function of the household migration status 
J
i M , a set of individual characteristics  i X , a range of household and wealth related variables  i W  
(including non-labor income), and a set of regional level characteristics  i Y : 




i Y W X M P e b b b b b + ¢ + ¢ + ¢ + + = 3 2 2 1 0 *          (1) 
 
where  * i P   is  an  unobserved  (latent)  variable  that  represents  the  propensity  that  women  and  men 
participate in the labor force. Observed is the categorical labor outcome variable, 
S
i P , that is positive if 
* i P > 0 and indicates whether the i
th person is wage employed (s=1), paid self-employed (s=2) or an 
unpaid worker (s=3) (zero otherwise). We also observe labor hours worked last week, which we use as 
dependent variable in an analogous model. 
Our coefficients of interest are the effects of household migration status 
J
i M  on the labor supply by 
gender, where the J
th alternative indicates the different individual migration exposure, i.e. whether the 
person has a household member currently abroad (J=1), whether hes/his household members migrated 
in the past (J=2), and  whether she/he has  direct foreign  labor  experience (J=3). 
i e   is  the random 
variable of the estimated equation. 
Different methods can be used to estimate the labor choice equation above but causal interpretation of 
cross-sectional migration effects will be problematic if our empirical model is affected by endogeneity 
concerns. An immediate claim is that migration is a selective process and unobservable characteristics 
(at individual and household level) shape the choice of engaging in different forms migration. Indeed, 
the selection bias comes from the fact that households might have an ‘implicit’ propensity for migration 
based on different reasons, some of which are not observed, and which may be associated with the 
likelihood of men and women to work. Moreover, regional level characteristics related to labor access 
and social services may influence both the decision to migrate and to participate in the labor market, 
including gender differences in the latter. It is not clear a priori how endogeneity concerns might affect 
the estimates. On the one hand, better-off, more able or ‘liberal’ men may be more likely to migrate but 
also more likely to encourage female household members to enter into the formal labor market; in this 
case our estimates would be biased upward. On the other hand, households with migrants may already 
be close to their optimal utility level which would decrease their incentive to increase labor supply (in 
this case our estimates would be biased toward zero).  Thus, we address the potential endogenity bias by 
using an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to estimate the labor choice model in either paid or unpaid 
work..  


















1 0 g g g g g       (2) 
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where 
J
i M  are binary endogenous variables equal to 1 if the i
th individual belongs to the J
th migration 
alternative as described above (zero otherwise). Migration status depends on the same set of personal, 
household and regional level characteristics included in the labor force participation equation, and on a 
set of exogenous variables  i Z that are included in the migration equation only as instrumental variables. 
Given  the  simultaneity  of  time  allocation  decisions  in  concomitant  occupational  opportunities,  we 
estimate the system of equations (1)-(2) above through a 3SLS estimator, which produces consistent 
estimates and account for correlation structure in the disturbances across labor choice equations. We 
estimate a system of linear probability models as the latter are generally more tractable for assessing 




5. Baseline models and results 
We start by examining the differences in labor market outcomes across individuals according to their 
exposure  to  international  migration.  We  model  the  labour  supply  decision  in  reduced  form  as  in 
equation (1) and estimate employment outcomes as a function of individual, household and regional 
characteristics. The hypothesis under test is whether international migration experience has a different 
effect (if any) on male and female labor market outcomes at origin, controlling for the income effect.  
According to an extensive literature, individual’s characteristics, such as education and age, shape the 
decision to participate in labor markets by reflecting the potential market wage of the individual such 
that, ceteris paribus, older, more educated workers are expected to obtain higher wages, and therefore 
to be more likely of participating in paid employment (Pencavel, 1986). Family attributes, such as 
number of dependents and their age structure, affect participation differently, depending on gender and 
marital  status  of  the  individuals.  Although  family  characteristics  may  not  directly  affect  potential 
market wages, they influence the decision to stay home by increasing or decreasing the individual 
reservation wage. 
The behavior of men and women are known to differ with respect to forms of participation in family 
life and responsibilities for child care. While there is no such a theory explaining female labor supply, a 
substantial literature documents that in a “traditional society,” married women participate less in paid 
employment  whilst  they  undertake  more  all  household  production.
23  Major  factors  influencing  a 
woman’s choices to work, then, are marriage, the family (the number and ages of children), partner’s 
position  and  income,  along  with  her  own  educational  level  and  occupation  characteristics  (e.g. 
Heckman,  1974;  Pencavel,  1986).  In  our  labor  choice  specification,  the  number  of  children  in  the 
household is disaggregated into four groups and gender (children younger than 4, children 5-10, male 
                                                 
22  Heckman  and  MaCurdy  (1985)  show  that  in  case  of  simultaneous  linear  probability  models,  IV  procedure  produces 
consistent estimates. 
23 This has bee also called ‘intra-household specialization’ (e.g. Hanson, 2005), assuming that women have a comparative 
advantage in home production, but here cultural norms and institutions (e.g. related to gender relations) play an important role.   16 
children 11-14, female children 11-14) in order to reflect different child care costs and opportunity costs 
of participating in the labor force.  
We first focus on the pooled sample of working age males and females (i.e. 16-64 years old) and 
estimate a system of linear probability models, where the migration variables are interacted with a 
female dummy.  
Results  of  models  are  reported  in  Table  5  and  standard  errors  are  adjusted  for  correlation  across 
equations.  For  comparison  purposes,  we  also  estimate  the  labor  participation  function  through  a 
multinomial probabilistic model (results and marginal effects are available from authors upon request). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Columns 1-3 report results of the baseline regression which includes migration and gender related 
variables  only.  Our  first  explanatory  variable  is  whether  the  person  is  female:  as  expected,  the 
coefficients on that variable show that being a female decreases the probability of working in the 
remunerative labor market while increasing the likelihood of being an unpaid worker. Coefficients of 
current  and  past  migration  variables,  though,  are  different  in  sign  and  significance  across  gender, 
suggesting that for women living in Albania international migration exposure has a significant effect on 
their labor market behavior. While having migrant household members currently abroad is negatively 
associated to the male probability of having a paid job, it is positively correlated with the likelihood that 
women work as self-employed or as unpaid worker in either a farm or non-farm activity. Also past 
migration  experience  through  family  members  have  a  significant  positive  effect  on  female  self-
employment, whilr the effect is significantly negative on male paid work supply.  
We then  amend  our  baseline regression  model  with  a range  of individual,  household and regional 
characteristics in order to control for both supply and demand-side factors affecting individual labor 
force participation. In particular, along with standard demographic characteristics, we include a set of 
household assets variables, such as land and car ownership, water and phone fix inside dwelling, as to 
proxy for the wealth position of the household. Moreover we include a range of regional characteristics, 
i.e. the 2002 national unemployment rate at district level, whether the community has a police station 
and garbage collection service, and regional dummies
24, in order to control for the local economic 
setting and labor demand. Columns 4-6 report the results of the regression model further augmented 
with a range of interaction variables between family structure and being female, as a proxy of time 
availability and work proclivity. Some of these controls result to be very significant both for male and 
female labor market participation while the significance level of the gender gap decreases with respect 
to  all  labor  outcomes.  Overall,  results  are  consistent  with  those  of  other  studies  of  labor  force 
participation. We find that variables customarily used to explain labor force participation are important 
in determining the odds of participation in each of the four labor force states considered here. As   17 
expected, female labor supply and household migration decisions are significantly affected by working 
time constraints related to the household structure, in particular with respect to children presence which 
may constitute a constraint on economic choices of the household. Proxies for the wage offers (age, 
education, number of children, and area of living), and variables for home productivity and tastes 
(marital status; presence of children, disabled family members) are, for the most part, significantly 
related  to  the  likelihood  of  labor  force  participation.
25  As  our  variables  of  interest  are  concerned, 
household migration status still has a different effect on women relative to men. Current migrants 
decrease  the  likelihood  of  male  self-employment,  while  the  opposite  holds  for  women.  Also  past 
migration  experience  of  household  members  is  positively  associated  with  female  self-employment 
while being negatively correlated with female unpaid work. It is worth noting that having direct foreign 
experience is negatively related to male wage employment, whilst it decreases unpaid work supply for 
both men and women.
26 
In order to distinguish the ‘behavioral’ effect of migration from the income (remittance) effect, we 
further include per capita non-labor earnings (both cash and in-kind) as explanatory variables of labor 
market outcomes, and migration findings are unchanged. Results in columns 7-9 show that most of 
unearned international income flows are negatively associated with formal labor market participation in 
that they are likely to increase the reservation wage. We distinguish between remittances received from 
core family members currently away, remittances received in the previous 12 months from former 
migrants either abroad or in Albania, and other non-labor income (e.g. rents, pensions, dividends etc.). 
Even though these flows are likely to be endogenous to the labor participation choice, it is worth noting 
that migration variables are robust to the introduction of these additional controls, while the pure gender 
effect decreases further. This is to say that household migration status has a significant behavioral 
impact on non-migrants’ labor market outcomes irrespective of, and beyond, the inflow of remittances 
or other income effects. This is not surprising, as remittances received in cash or in kind are fungible, 
plus do not account for the money and skills brought back home by returning Albanians, for a season or 
for  good.  Thus,  considering  remittances  only  may  disguise  the  purposive  behavioral  impact  of 
migration across household members in terms of benefits and obligations for all of them.  
 
Focusing on our variables of interest using separate linear equations of labor market behavior for males 
and females, Table 6 reports the effect of household members’ migration experience on their labor 
market outcomes, controlling for the full set of individual, households and regional characteristics as 
above (for robustness check, marginal effects of multinomial logit models were calculated and are 
                                                                                                                                                            
24 All forms of migration are equally represented in all Albanian regions included in the regression model (slightly less in 
mountain urban regions only).  
25 The model is also estimated excluding the number of children under six in order to account for the potential simultaneity 
bias due to fertility to labor force decisions jointly determined (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980). Further checks has been done 
with respect to other potential endogenous variables (such as those related to the household wealth position) but results are 
consistent with those reported. 
26 Yet, as we discussed above, the incidence of female past migration is very low in Albania (around 3% in our nationally 
representative sample), but excluding this control from the model does not change the results.   18 
available  from  the  authors  upon  request).  Colums  (1)-(9)  includes  alternative  migration  variables 
separately and coefficient estimates show the importance of disaggregating heterogenous migration 
effects. Having any (current or past) migration experience in the household seem to have a negative 
effect on female wage employment and male paid self-employment, while having a positive effect on 
overall unpaid work supply. Yet, disentangling different forms of family migration experience delivers 
asymmetric results (col. (4)-(9)). Accounting for the coexistence of current and past migration episodes 
of household members, results in columns (10)-(12) show different effects on male and female labor 
market  behavior,  which  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  remittances  (columns  (13)-(15)).
27  While 
household  migration  exposure  shows  a  (weak)  positive  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  female  self-
employment, negative effects on male paid occupations, and positive on unpaid work, may be explained 
by men waiting for the next migration episode while being back home.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In order to further explore gender disparities in labor supply we also estimate the same model for males 
and females as above, by using the reported number of hours worked in the previous week as dependent 
variable.  This is also informative with respect to the argument that self-employment may provide a 
more  ‘flexible’  work  environment  where  less  labor  hours  may  be  supplied,  especially  by  women 
(Boden 1999, Connely 1992, Hundley 2000). Results from a Tobit regression are reported in Table 7 
showing that individuals, significantly men, with any family migration experience supply less hours of 
work.
 28 
Table 7 about here 
 
When disaggregating by type of work and type of migration experience, though, the coefficient are 
more  precisely  estimated.  In  particular,  in  households  with  past  migration  experience,  women 
significantly supply more labor hours in self-employment whilst men seem to supply more work in 
unpaid occupations. Overall, these results are consistent with previous aggregate evidence on similar 
patterns in different countries (e.g. Hanson, 2005), but accounting for the heterogeneity in household 
migration  and  work  status,  controlling  for  the  income  effect,  offer  further  insights  into  gender 
differentials in labor market behavior upon family migration experience. It is worth noting that while 
male and female labor supplies respond differently to past household migration episodes, having a 
direct migration experience decreases labor hours as unpaid worker for both men and women, and 
increases hours supplied in wage employment (the last coefficient is not significant for men, though). 
Overall,  these  findings  may  be  consistent  with  a  shift  in  the  bargaining  process  and  control  over 
                                                 
27 We have explored migration-female labor force participation for different age groups and for married women (with children) 
only, and findings do not show significant patterns for sub-groups with the respect to the whole population. 
28 We use a Tobit model given that hours worked are zero for many individuals. Simple OLS regressions, though, yield the 
same qualitative results.   19 
resources  within  the  household  left  behind.  It  could  be  also  argued,  though,  that  unobserved 
characteristics make men remaining in Albania less likely to work in self-employment, for example 
(where  the  opposite  would  operate  for  women  as  well).  In  other  words,  results  are  potentially 
contaminated  by  unobserved  household  characteristics  that  may  be  correlated  with  both  household 
migration behavior and labor supply. We tackle this issue in the next section. 
 
6. The labor market impact of migration: IV results 
We are ultimately interested in examining the impact of having a migrant household member on the 
relative  and  absolute  female  labor  force  participation  in  concomitant  occupation  opportunities  (i.e. 
wage-employment, paid self-employment and unpaid work). Although we have checked the robustness 
of our results to the introduction of a number of control variables, if our empirical model is affected by 
endogeneity of the household migration status, as we discussed above, the simple way to estimate the 
migration-labor  relations  through  a  multivariate  analysis  will  be  unlikely  to  provide  a  consistent 
estimate of the ‘true’ impact of migration. Thus, in order to address this issue, we estimate the system of 
equations (1)-(2) above through an IV strategy and a 3SLS estimator. The key to such approach is a 
well-behaved instrumental variable. For this purpose we use a set of the following instruments, related 
to some features of the context we study: (i) a binary variable equal to 1 if the head of household or 
his/her spouse had any family friends or relatives living abroad in 1990; (ii) a binary variable equal to 1 
if there is more than one male in the extended family (i.e. all household members, including those 
currently abroad); (iii) the percentage of households with members abroad in municipality of residence 
in 1995. The latter is a standard proxy for migration networks within each municipality that influence 
the  opportunity  to  migrate  by  reducing  potential  hazard  and costs,  both at  home  and  in  migration 
destinations (Massey et al., 1993; Massey and Espinosa, 1997)
29. We use migration intensity 10 years 
prior the year of the survey in order to minimise potential contemporaneous correlation between the 
latter variable and employment outcomes.
30 Thus, as long as we control for district-level unemployment 
rate and regional fixed effects, we assume that previous migrant networks do not affect current labor 
market  outcomes  directly  (exclusion  restriction),  unless  via  the  migration  behaviour  of  household 
members (first stage). Similarly, by employing the measure of contact with people abroad in the 1990, 
which marks the end of people’s mobility controls
31, we capture the presence of migration networks 
within the family, that are assumed to directly influence the migrant status of households (first stage) 
                                                 
29 A number of recent papers have used a measure of the migrant network as an instrument for migration. Migrant networks 
constitute an information channel in that living close to other people having migration experience may educate potential 
migrants about the conditions in specific migration destinations (i.e. information costs decrease) and lead to a better settlement 
of chain-migrants at destination (Massey 1998; Orrenious, 1999). Similarly, they serve to relax credit constraints (Genicot and 
Sensky, 2004) and can increase the economic returns to migration (Mushi, 2003). 
30 The choice of a 10 year ‘migration network’ is arbitrary but our results are robust to using migration network at different 
points in time. 
31 During the communist government (1944-1990), migration had come to a virtual halt, with migration officially prohibited 
and emigrants and family members left behind ostracized or severely punished. With the fall of the government, the end of the 
controls on internal and external migration and the unraveling of the centrally planned economy unleashed a demographic shift 
at an unprecedented pace, as individuals and entire households started migrating to the cities or leaving the country altogether 
(Carletto et al, 2004; King and Vullnetari, 2003).    20 
while being orthogonal to the labor market behaviour in Albania (exclusion restriction)
32. Finally, based 
on  a  feature  of  migration  that  is  peculiar  to  the  patriarchal  Albanian  context,  we  argue  that  a 
discontinuity in the family gender composition may be particularly significant in relaxing some gender 
specific constraints to migration, without directly affecting individual employment outcomes. Indeed, if 
there is only one man in the household (11 percent of the case in our sample), he will be less likely to 
leave the household and migrate abroad, as women left behind may hardly substitute his male-specific 
obligations within the household economy
33. Thus, the presence of more than one man in the household 
may affect the migration decision of household members (first stage), without being relevant for the 
labour market behaviour of the rest of the household (exclusion restriction).
34 Results are reported in 
Table  8,  where  we  present  labor  outcomes  specifications  with  both  any  and  heterogeneous  family 
migration experience as explanatory variables. The instrument sensitivity analysis (col. (1)-(6)), the 
high values of the F-statistics for the excluded instruments and the Sargan overidentification test (when 
applicable) support the validity of our instruments. Full regression results for the most comprehensive 
specifications for women and men (col.(7)-(9)), joint with first stage migration regressions, are reported 
in Tables A3-A6 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Results from the IV regression show that household migration experience is negatively associated with 
male  and  female  wage  employment  and  positively  with  engagement  in  paid  self-employment  for 
women only. Disaggregating by types of migration, past international migration of household members 
significantly  increases  the  probability  of  women  to  supply  labor  in  paid  self-employment  (at  1% 
significance level) and decrease their propensity to work in unpaid occupations. The same effect does 
not hold for male labor market behaviour. The effect of household migrants currently abroad, though, 
significantly  decreases  the  likelihood  of  female  self-employment  (at  10%  significance  level)  while 
increases female unpaid labor supply at 1% significance level. This may be explained by the early stage 
of the migration process that requires more effort at home to replace people recently left. Still we do not 
find evidence of such effects for male labor force population. Results reported in Table 8 are robust to 
alternative specifications and sensitivity checks of specific instrument selections.
35  
                                                 
32 It should be recalled that the framework of the survey is such that past migration experience of household members occurred 
since  1990  and  is  self-reported  by  current  members  of  the  core  households.  On  the  contrary,  past  migration  experience 
occurred before 1990 refers to friends and relatives out of the core household (in other words the two variables do not overlap). 
33 Just as women are assigned different roles in the society, they tend to have different roles from men within the family. 
Women  in  Albania  (especially  in  rural  or  remote  areas  where  mentalities  and  traditions  are  more  conservative)  are  still 
dependent on men for many different activities such as credit access, house maintenance, agricultural work (due to relatively 
little use of mechanization), personal security concerns (see Common Country Assessment Albania, 2002). 
34 Indeed, in our sample the presence of only one male is irrelevant to female labor supply: female participation rate is not 
statistically different according to the presence of more than one male in the household. Also, controlling for appropriate 
demographic characteristics, the number of males exercise no influence on (gender differentials in) labor supply. Yet, male-
specific obligations make Albanian households with a single male much less likely to undertake migration.  
35 Other instruments used, without no significant difference in results, are the presence of more than one male in the household 
excluding members currently away, two separate dummies whether head or spouse had any relative or friend abroad in 1990.   21 
The difference in magnitude and significance of IV results with respect to OLS suggests that the latter 
may  be  biased  by  some  unobservable  characteristics  in  the  stochastic  disturbance,  correlated  with 
having a migrant in the household. Indeed, whether or not to engage in migration is a selective process, 
as is the decision about which form of migration to engage in
36. In particular, if worse-off women (i.e. 
in more rigid gender regime or lower socioeconomic status) are more likely to stay behind and less 
likely to engage in paid occupations in the labor market (more likely to supply unpaid work), the effect 
of family migration on paid employment (unpaid work) will be downward biased (upward biased). Yet, 
female are likely to allocate their time depending on the achievement of specific migrant members or 
may  vary  their  labor  response  to  changes  in  the  migration  circumstances  over  time.  If  in  general 
international migration requires more up-front resources in its earlier stage, the effect of having current 
international migrant members on female paid labor supply (unpaid labor supply) will be overestimated 
(underestimated). Thus, without correcting for the endogeneity bias is unlikely to reveal the ‘true’ 
impact of migration on household members left behind. 
We interpret our IV results on gender-differentials in the labor market as evidence that, in a traditional 
society, male-dominated migration exposure may lead women left behind to ultimately gain access to 
labor market opportunities and earn a positive income. These findings are related to previous evidence 
on female labor supply upon migration experience, showing that migration (and/or remittances) either 
decreases both male and female labor supply (Hanson 2005), or decrease female labor supply in low-
paid and informal jobs  (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo., 2006). We argue, though, that the gender bias of 
migration behavior and the high incidence of temporary or circular migration in countries with a long 
migration history (such as Albania, and similarly Mexico) may lead men to increasingly confide in this 
source of foreign earnings while being at home, while women get access to more remunerative local 
market jobs. This outcome may be viewed as an emancipating process for women, increasing their 
control over decision-making within the household. 
 
6.1 Heterogeneous effects on female labor supply 
However,  migration  behavioral  impact  on  female  household  members  left  behind  may  be  at  work 
thorough further effects, such as a change in human capital accumulation or fertility choices. Even 
though we do not tackle these mechanisms directly, we rule out confounding factors by carrying out a 
sensitivity analysis of our results. Table 9 presents IV estimates for a set of sub-samples defined by 
observable individual attributes correlated with female labor supply, i.e. by age profile, education and 
family structure. 
Table 9 about here 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
We present results excluding potentially endogenous variables of non-labor income (e.g. remittances) but including them 
deliver similar results. 
36  E.g. who is going to migrate in the household, how many times (re-migration) and how long for.   22 
As shown in Panel A, labor market outcomes of working age older women (i.e. more than 33 years old) 
are robust to previous average results. They are more precisely estimated than it is the case for youth, as 
they are less likely to be confounded by the human capital bias (i.e. as a result of household migration, 
young women may stay longer in school, that is out of the labor force). Panel B shows that results differ 
when splitting the whole sample by educational levels, though. Household migration status changes 
labor market outcomes of less educated women, but has a small and statistically insignificant effect on 
those with a secondary education degree or higher. This finding suggests that migration empowerment 
implications for female members left behind are higher for less educated women, as we would expect 
provided  the  strong  positive  correlation  between  human  capital  and  female  (paid)  employment 
outcomes. Finally, Panel C shows that our results are more precisely estimated in the sub-group of 
women without young children (less than 4 years old), even though the signs of migration effects are 
stable also for the other sub-sample. This finding is also consistent with the large evidence on women’s 
work choices constrained by children presence (in the absence of child care services).  
Overall our evidence is consistent with the literature showing that more disadvantaged groups (such as 
women with respect to men, on average, or less educated adult women compared to young or skilled 
ones) are especially responsive to new market opportunities made available by ‘economic globalization’ 
and the opening of the borders (Mushi and Rosenzweig, 2006; Luke and Munshi, 2007). 
 
7. Conclusions 
This  paper  examines  the  role  of  male-dominated  international  migration  in  shaping  labor  market 
outcomes by gender in migrant-sending households at origin. Using detailed information on family 
migration experience from the latest Albanian LSMS, we find that there is a different pattern in the 
occupational  distribution  of  female  and  male  work  force  back  home.  Unlike  earlier  studies,  we 
distinguish the ‘disruptive’ effect of household members’ departure from the income effect of two 
forms of family migration experience, and investigate their impact on paid and unpaid labor market 
status of household members left behind. Estimates show that male and female labor supplies respond 
differently to current and past migration episodes, and the migration effects are robust to the income 
(remittance) effect. Accounting for the endogeneity of migration behavior by using an IV estimation 
strategy, we find that having household members currently living abroad decreases the probability of 
women to engage in paid employment and increase their unpaid work supply. On the contrary, having 
household members migrated abroad in the past significantly increases female labor supply in self-
employment while decreasing unpaid work supply. We do not find evidence of the same pattern for the 
male labor force population. Moreover, by accounting for key factors (related to age, education and 
child caring) that exert a great influence on female labor supply, we find that more disadvantaged 
Albanian women (e.g. less educated) with male-dominated household migration experience are more 
likely to shift their occupational choices and gain access to remunerative employment. 
Our findings support the argument that in a traditional society like Albania migration of household   23 
members may be a source of both income and bargaining power among members of the family at 
origin. The gender-biased patterns observed in Albania seem to suggest that, over time, male-dominated 
migration  influences  women’s  employment  status  and  income-earning  capacity,  thereby  potentially 
enhancing their role as agents of change in the society. This evidence contributes in shedding light on 
one of the most contentious impact of migration on economic development at origin, by impinging on 
the gender differentials in the international and local labor market behaviour.   24 
TABLES 
 
Table 5. Labor market outcomes (pooled linear model): Coefficient estimates  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   Baseline model  Model with controls  Model with controls& remittances 
Unpaid  Unpaid  Unpaid    Wage 
Empl. 
Paid 








Self-empl.  work 
Female  -0.164***  -0.123***  0.210***  -0.055  -0.022  0.027  -0.051  -0.022  0.03 
  (10.13)  (9.12)  (13.12)  (1.35)  (0.60)  (0.73)  (1.25)  (0.59)  (0.80) 
Current hh migrants  -0.032*  -0.031**  0.030*  0.014  -0.052***  -0.009  0.038*  -0.047**  -0.015 
  (1.82)  (2.10)  (1.71)  (0.86)  (3.56)  (0.58)  (1.67)  (2.36)  (0.73) 
Past hh migrants  -0.160***  -0.050**  0.201***  -0.039*  -0.031  0.096***  -0.039*  -0.032  0.096*** 
  (6.65)  (2.50)  (8.48)  (1.72)  (1.53)  (4.60)  (1.69)  (1.60)  (4.57) 
Past indiv. migration  0.014  0.007  -0.026  0.029*  -0.012  -0.056***  0.029*  -0.012  -0.057*** 
   (0.88)  (0.48)  (1.57)  (1.87)  (0.86)  (3.97)  (1.90)  (0.90)  (4.02) 
Current hh migrants*fem.  -0.037  0.035  0.044*  -0.032  0.044**  0.027  -0.031  0.045**  0.026 
  (1.45)  (1.63)  (1.74)  (1.37)  (2.07)  (1.24)  (1.32)  (2.12)  (1.18) 
Past hh migrants*fem.  0.064**  0.068***  -0.091***  0.007  0.055**  -0.055**  0.006  0.055**  -0.055** 
  (2.14)  (2.72)  (3.08)  (0.25)  (2.21)  (2.15)  (0.23)  (2.20)  (2.15) 
Past indiv. migration*fem.  0.114**  -0.054  -0.202***  0.038  -0.02  -0.123***  0.034  -0.017  -0.117*** 
   (2.08)  (1.18)  (3.74)  (0.77)  (0.46)  (2.70)  (0.68)  (0.38)  (2.58) 
Married        0.051**  0.058***  -0.078***  0.052**  0.058***  -0.080*** 
        (2.26)  (2.89)  (3.76)  (2.31)  (2.90)  (3.84) 
Married*fem.        -0.082***  -0.122***  0.158***  -0.085***  -0.121***  0.158*** 
        (3.21)  (5.38)  (6.74)  (3.32)  (5.34)  (6.75) 
Age        0.015***  0.016***  0.001  0.015***  0.016***  0.001 
        (4.40)  (5.34)  (0.20)  (4.38)  (5.26)  (0.19) 
Age squared        -0.000***  -0.000***  0  -0.000***  -0.000***  0 
        (4.16)  (4.37)  (0.35)  (4.15)  (4.28)  (0.37) 
N. of adults in hh        -0.008*  -0.003  -0.005  -0.008*  -0.002  -0.004 
        (1.70)  (0.60)  (1.27)  (1.80)  (0.50)  (0.98) 
N. of children 0-4        -0.004  0.01  -0.002  -0.005  0.011  0 
        (0.36)  (1.01)  (0.23)  (0.47)  (1.09)  (0.01) 
N. of children 5-10        -0.015  -0.005  0.020**  -0.015  -0.005  0.020** 
        (1.53)  (0.60)  (2.25)  (1.55)  (0.56)  (2.23) 
N. of male children 11-14      0.018  -0.033**  -0.006  0.017  -0.033**  -0.005 
        (1.17)  (2.45)  (0.45)  (1.12)  (2.40)  (0.36) 
N. of female children 11-14      0.040***  -0.064***  -0.014  0.041***  -0.064***  -0.012 
        (2.72)  (4.90)  (1.00)  (2.78)  (4.86)  (0.87) 
N. of adults in hh*fem.      0.003  -0.007  0.012*  0.003  -0.007  0.011* 
        (0.47)  (1.17)  (1.84)  (0.45)  (1.19)  (1.77) 
N. of children 0-4*fem.      -0.026  -0.023  -0.027*  -0.026  -0.024  -0.028* 
        (1.56)  (1.56)  (1.76)  (1.58)  (1.61)  (1.83) 
N. of children 5-10*fem.      -0.016  0.017  0.008  -0.016  0.017  0.007 
        (1.13)  (1.35)  (0.59)  (1.10)  (1.36)  (0.54) 
N. of male children  
11-14*fem.        -0.044**  0.036*  0.024  -0.044*  0.036*  0.023 
        (1.96)  (1.82)  (1.17)  (1.96)  (1.80)  (1.10) 
N. of fem. children  
11-14*fem.        -0.065***  0.058***  0.007  -0.066***  0.059***  0.007 
        (3.02)  (3.01)  (0.38)  (3.06)  (3.06)  (0.37) 
Education (years)        0.033***  -0.008***  -0.014***  0.033***  -0.008***  -0.014*** 
        (16.68)  (4.29)  (7.93)  (16.75)  (4.29)  (7.92) 
Chronic ill in hh        -0.006  -0.003  0.023**  -0.005  -0.004  0.022** 
        (0.55)  (0.34)  (2.40)  (0.48)  (0.42)  (2.34) 
Asset position:                   
Car ownership        -0.115***  0.123***  0.002  -0.113***  0.125***  0.004 
        (7.56)  (9.07)  (0.11)  (7.45)  (9.24)  (0.28) 
Water inside dwellling      0.035***  0.061***  -0.115***  0.035***  0.063***  -0.113*** 
        (2.68)  (5.28)  (9.62)  (2.67)  (5.40)  (9.37) 
House fixed phone line      0.074***  -0.019  -0.007  0.074***  -0.019  -0.005 
        (4.72)  (1.39)  (0.46)  (4.70)  (1.35)  (0.35) 
Land owned (ha.)      -0.087***  0  0.202***  -0.090***  -0.003  0.202*** 
        (5.96)  (0.01)  (14.96)  (6.13)  (0.26)  (14.89) 
Land owned sq. (ha.)        0.012***  0.002  -0.030***  0.013***  0.002  -0.030*** 
        (3.47)  (0.55)  (9.06)  (3.63)  (0.77)  (9.06) 
Regional controls:                   
District unempl. rate 2002      -0.003***  -0.002**  0.002**  -0.003***  -0.001**  0.002** 
        (4.15)  (2.30)  (2.33)  (3.90)  (2.02)  (2.29)   25 
Table 5. Continuation  
                   
Community has garbage 
 collection        0.081***  0.00  -0.113***  0.078***  0.003  -0.111*** 
        (4.31)  (0.00)  (6.53)  (4.13)  (0.15)  (6.37) 
Community has police  
station        -0.025  0.028*  0.01  -0.022  0.029*  0.009 
        (1.49)  (1.83)  (0.64)  (1.31)  (1.89)  (0.57) 
Tirana        0.178***  -0.173***  -0.072**  0.181***  -0.183***  -0.080*** 
        (5.79)  (6.33)  (2.55)  (5.85)  (6.63)  (2.82) 
Coast urban region        0.105***  -0.112***  -0.055**  0.106***  -0.121***  -0.065** 
        (3.47)  (4.13)  (1.98)  (3.47)  (4.42)  (2.32) 
Coast rural region        0.043*  0.015  -0.079***  0.043*  0.01  -0.085*** 
        (1.91)  (0.75)  (3.84)  (1.91)  (0.53)  (4.16) 
Central urban region        0.031  -0.120***  -0.062**  0.031  -0.130***  -0.071** 
        (0.99)  (4.35)  (2.16)  (0.99)  (4.67)  (2.47) 
Central rural region        0.060***  -0.113***  0.110***  0.063***  -0.118***  0.104*** 
        (3.16)  (6.63)  (6.24)  (3.29)  (6.86)  (5.87) 
Mountain urban region      0.057  -0.150***  -0.086**  0.056  -0.161***  -0.097** 
        (1.26)  (3.70)  (2.05)  (1.22)  (3.95)  (2.30) 
Remittances and non-lab income:                 
Remitt. from current int.nal             -0.004  -0.001  0.001 
migr. (log, pc)            (1.59)  (0.38)  (0.34) 
Rem/gifts from relatives             -0.004*  -0.002  0.003 
abroad -last 12 months (log, pc)            (1.84)  (1.13)  (1.52) 
Rem/gifts from relatives in             -0.004  0.005**  -0.001 
Albania -last 12 months (log, pc)            (1.64)  (2.02)  (0.58) 
Other non-lab income (log, pc)            0.00  -0.004*  -0.007*** 
              (0.11)  (1.90)  (3.75) 
Constant  0.430***  0.234***  0.202***  -0.244***  0.007  0.396***  -0.240***  0.012  0.399*** 
  (40.24)  (26.38)  (19.19)  (3.85)  (0.12)  (6.79)  (3.78)  (0.22)  (6.83) 
Observations  6592  6592  6592 
Notes  Absolute value of z statistics in brackets               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             26 
Table 6.  Labor market outcomes by gender (linear model): Coefficient estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
Wage  Paid  Unpaid  Wage  Paid  Unpaid  Wage  Paid  Unpaid  Wage  Paid  Unpaid  Wage  Paid  Unpaid 
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work 
  FEMALE 
Any hh migr  -0.028**  0.014  0.031**                                  
  (2.12)  (1.18)  (2.09)                             
Current hh migr        -0.019  -0.001  0.003          -0.02  0.00  0.005  0.019  0.014  0.023 
        (1.25)  (0.08)  (0.18)          (1.36)  (0.03)  (0.33)  (0.78)  (0.58)  (0.82) 
Past hh migr.               -0.023*  0.027**  0.034**  -0.02  0.025*  0.026*  -0.019  0.023*  0.024 
               (1.69)  (2.1)  (2.21)  (1.47)  (1.96)  (1.67)  (1.39)  (1.82)  (1.58) 
Past indiv. migr                       0.073*  -0.032  -0.164***  0.065*  -0.03  -0.155*** 
                       (1.88)  (0.87)  (3.78)  (1.68)  (0.83)  (3.57) 
                                 
Indiv., hh and  
regional controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Remittances and other 
non-labor income  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
R-sq  0.35  0.16  0.44  0.35  0.17  0.44  0.34  0.17  0.44  0.35  0.17  0.45  0.35  0.17  0.45 
Observations  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852 
  MALE 
Any hh migr  -0.001  -0.055***  0.035**                                     
  (0.07)  (3.59)  (2.44)                             
Current hh migr.        0.018  -0.063***  -0.007          0.016  -0.062***  -0.001  0.029  -0.062**  0.00 
        (0.95)  (3.86)  (0.44)          (0.84)  (3.84)  (0.06)  (0.96)  (2.38)  (0.01) 
Past hh migr.               -0.043*  -0.031  0.123***  -0.038  -0.036  0.109***  -0.038  -0.037*  0.109*** 
               (1.73)  (1.43)  (6.07)  (1.49)  (1.6)  (5.28)  (1.49)  (1.66)  (5.28) 
Past indiv. migr.                     0.017  -0.009  -0.048***  0.017  -0.01  -0.047*** 
                       (0.95)  (0.59)  (3.39)  (0.98)  (0.64)  (3.38) 
                               
Indiv., hh and  
regional controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Remittances and other 
non-labor income  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
R-sq  0.15  0.18  0.22  0.15  0.18  0.22  0.15  0.18  0.23  0.15  0.18  0.23  0.15  0.19  0.23 
Observations  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740 






   27 
Table 7.  (Log) Weekly hours worked by gender: Tobit model (coeff. estimates)  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Tot Hours  Tot Hours  Tot Hours  H.Wage  H. Paid  H. Unpaid   H. Wage  H. Paid  H. Unpaid   H. Wage  H. Paid  H. Unpaid  
   worked  worked  worked  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work 
  FEMALE 
Any hh migrant  -1.306      -0.330*  0.426  0.19               
  (1.50)      (1.86)  (1.19)  (1.52)               
Current hh migrants    -2.089**  0.018          -0.261  0.036  -0.041  0.202  0.452  -0.292 
    (2.14)  (0.01)          (1.25)  (0.09)  (0.29)  (0.61)  (0.71)  (1.21) 
Past hh migrants    -0.349  -0.442          -0.232  0.751**  0.127  -0.241  0.716*  0.113 
    (0.38)  (0.49)          (1.19)  (2.05)  (1.00)  (1.24)  (1.96)  (0.89) 
Past indiv. migration    -2.994  -3.016          0.868**  -1.682  -1.321***  0.788*  -1.704  -1.219*** 
    (1.14)  (1.15)          (1.99)  (1.31)  (3.05)  (1.80)  (1.32)  (2.82) 
                         
Indiv., hh and  
regional controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Remittances and other 
non-labor income  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852  2852 
  MALE 
Any hh migrant  -2.901***      0.007  -0.822***  0.37                
  (3.37)      (0.04)  (3.13)  (1.44)               
Current hh migrants    -3.222***  -2.384         0.146  -0.941***  0.113  0.27  -0.796*  0.059 
    (3.52)  (1.63)         (0.90)  (3.36)  (0.41)  (1.05)  (1.80)  (0.13) 
Past hh migrants    -1.642  -1.745         -0.341  -0.404  0.754**  -0.346  -0.425  0.747** 
    (1.30)  (1.39)         (1.43)  (1.02)  (2.21)  (1.45)  (1.08)  (2.20) 
Past indiv. migration    -0.479  -0.465         0.22  -0.148  -0.673**  0.226  -0.152  -0.664** 
    (0.56)  (0.55)         (1.49)  (0.59)  (2.54)  (1.52)  (0.60)  (2.51) 
                         
Indiv., hh and  
regional controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Remittances and other 
non-labor income  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740  3740 












Table 8.  Labor supply by gender: IV results  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Dependent variable:  Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Hours  Hours Paid  Hours 
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  WageEmpl.  Self-empl.  Unpaidwork 
  FEMALE 
Any hh migrant  -0.130*  0.273***  -0.098  -0.114  0.248***  -0.093             
  (1.65)  (3.51)  (1.12)  (1.50)  (3.31)  (1.09)             
Current hh migrants              -0.19  -0.270*  0.319**  -0.752  -0.908  1.101** 
              (1.45)  (1.73)  (2.12)  (1.54)  (1.58)  (2.03) 
Past hh migrants              -0.084  0.380***  -0.188*  -0.264  1.415***  -0.881** 
              (0.88)  (3.36)  (1.73)  (0.75)  (3.40)  (2.24) 
Past indiv. migration              0.663  -1.156  -0.016  2.179  -4.092  0.307 
              (1.11)  (1.62)  (0.02)  (0.97)  (1.56)  (0.12) 
Instruments:                         
Migration density at municip. in 1995  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990   no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
More than 1 man in the hh  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
F-test 1st stage  87.06  44.01  22.17  5.29 ,  39.29  21.64  5.34  38.53 
P-value joint  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Overid Sargan test        1.385  7.198  0.088             
Chi-sq(1) P-val        0.2393  0.0273  0.7673             
  MALE 
Any hh migrant  -0.165  -0.259  0.177  -0.171  -0.268  0.217             
  (0.77)  (1.37)  (1.02)  (0.84)  (1.48)  (1.30)             
Current hh migrants              -0.228  0.214  -0.031  -0.922  0.721  -0.193 
              (1.03)  (0.90)  (0.17)  (1.08)  (0.80)  (0.25) 
Past hh migrants              -0.071  -0.964  0.499  -0.391  -3.445  3.038 
              (0.09)  (1.13)  (0.77)  (0.13)  (1.07)  (1.12) 
Past indiv. migration              0.005  0.048  -0.027  0.072  0.175  -0.322 
              (0.03)  (0.27)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.58) 
Instruments:                         
Migration density at municip. in 1995  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990   no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
More than 1 man in the hh  No  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
F-test 1st stage  28.15  14.09  15.95  45.16  15.7  15.26  48.85  15.39 
P-value joint  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Overid Sargan test        0.02  1.026  0.305             
Chi-sq(1) P-val        0.8876  0.311  0.5809             
Notes Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All individual, household and regional level controls are included as in Table 6   29 
 
 
Table 9.  FEMALE labor market outcomes by age, education and family structure: IV results   
PANEL A 
  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work 
Sample:  Age 16-32  Age 33-64 
Current hh migrants      -0.297  0.045  0.196  -0.117  -0.543**  0.318* 
  (1.58)  (0.23)  (0.85)  (0.62)  (2.39)  (1.73) 
Past hh migrants  0.124  0.133  -0.227  -0.196  0.448***  -0.095 
  (0.71)  (0.75)  (1.05)  (1.64)  (3.10)  (0.81) 
Obs.  1172  1651 
PANEL B 
  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work 
Sample:  Primary education or lower  Secondary education or higher 
Current hh migrants  -0.268  -0.26  0.501*  -1.253  0.512  0.575 
  (0.48)  (0.76)  (0.22)  (0.53)  (0.58)  (0.50) 
Past hh migrants  0.122  0.312***  -0.345***  -2.489  1.635  0.992 
  (1.63)  (3.29)  (2.76)  (0.61)  (0.58)  (0.57) 
Obs.  1553  1251 
PANEL C 
  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work  Wage Empl.  Paid Self- empl.  Unpaid work 
Sample:  Young children (0-4)  No young children (0-4) 
Current hh migrants  -0.005  -2.446  4.074  -0.163  -0.254**  0.206* 
  (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.41)  (0.84)  (0.99) 
Past hh migrants  -0.254  2.76  -4.321  -0.108  0.246***  0.082 
  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (1.23)  (2.79)  (0.86) 
Obs.  626  2197 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All specifications include the full set of controls as in Table 9 and instruments (i.e. migration density at municip. in 1995, family/friends  
living abroad in 1990, more than 1 man in the hh) 
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Table A3.  Labor market outcomes by gender: IV results - FEMALE 
.  Dependent varianle  First stage 
  Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Current  Past hh  Past indiv.  
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  hh migr.  migr.  migr. 
Current hh migrants  -0.19  -0.270*  0.319**       
  (1.45)  (1.73)  (2.12)       
Past hh migrants   -0.084  0.380***  -0.188*       
   (0.88)  (3.36)  (1.73)       
Past indiv. migration  0.663  -1.156  -0.016       
  (1.11)  (1.62)  (0.02)       
Married  -0.044  -0.069**  0.073**  -0.042  0.024**  0.138*** 
  (1.60)  (2.10)  (2.30)  (1.56)  (2.27)  (4.72) 
Age  -0.004  0.004  0.023***  -0.041***  0  0.002 
  (0.50)  (0.42)  (2.74)  (7.71)  (0.14)  (0.42) 
Age squared  0  0  -0.000**  0.001***  0  0 
  (1.11)  (0.09)  (2.44)  (8.40)  (0.59)  (1.17) 
N. of adults in hh  0.002  -0.036***  0.017  -0.023***  -0.004*  0.051*** 
  (0.27)  (3.25)  (1.63)  (3.91)  (1.96)  (8.09) 
N. of children 0-4  -0.024  -0.053***  0.005  -0.040***  0.002  0.075*** 
  (1.53)  (2.88)  (0.26)  (2.88)  (0.40)  (5.01) 
N. of children 5-10  -0.030**  -0.009  0.048***  -0.067***  -0.002  -0.014 
  (2.44)  (0.58)  (3.37)  (5.89)  (0.48)  (1.12) 
N. of male children 11-14  -0.015  -0.027  0.025  -0.102***  -0.011  -0.01 
  (0.73)  (1.08)  (1.05)  (5.63)  (1.55)  (0.50) 
N. of female children11-14  -0.02  -0.015  -0.01  -0.043**  -0.004  -0.032* 
  (1.31)  (0.82)  (0.57)  (2.55)  (0.60)  (1.77) 
Education (years)  0.037***  -0.004  -0.012***  -0.005*  0.001  -0.001 
  (12.85)  (1.07)  (3.70)  (1.64)  (0.80)  (0.17) 
Chronic ill in hh  -0.01  0.031  0.001  0.065***  0.009  -0.015 
  (0.52)  (1.42)  (0.06)  (3.99)  (1.36)  (0.83) 
Asset position:             
Car ownership  -0.065***  0.070***  -0.019  0.035  0.009  0.048* 
  (2.93)  (2.67)  (0.74)  (1.43)  (0.98)  (1.86) 
Water inside dwellling  0.026  0.078***  -0.151***  0.019  0.020**  0.058** 
  (1.24)  (3.11)  (6.20)  (0.91)  (2.54)  (2.56) 
House fixed phone line  0.101***  0.041  -0.046  0.053**  0.007  -0.079*** 
  (3.83)  (1.32)  (1.51)  (2.12)  (0.70)  (2.94) 
Land owned (ha.)  -0.099***  -0.001  0.225***  0.069***  0.022**  0.068*** 
  (4.08)  (0.03)  (8.05)  (3.05)  (2.47)  (2.80) 
Land owned squared (ha.)  0.014***  0  -0.030***  -0.008  -0.002  -0.017*** 
  (2.77)  (0.05)  (5.23)  (1.38)  (0.73)  (2.80) 
Regional controls:             
District unempl.rate 2002  -0.003**  0  -0.001  0.006***  -0.001  -0.001 
  (2.19)  (0.11)  (0.69)  (5.03)  (1.31)  (0.79) 
Community has garbage coll.  -0.004  0.002  -0.139***  -0.044  0.015  -0.006 
  (0.16)  (0.05)  (4.65)  (1.50)  (1.29)  (0.18) 
Community has police station  -0.01  0.041  -0.011  0.051*  0.012  -0.011 
  (0.39)  (1.30)  (0.38)  (1.87)  (1.14)  (0.38) 
Tirana  0.212***  -0.197***  -0.154***  -0.064  -0.005  -0.137*** 
  (4.96)  (3.86)  (3.15)  (1.30)  (0.29)  (2.59) 
Coast urban region  0.163***  -0.127**  -0.151***  0.037  0.009  -0.086* 
  (3.80)  (2.48)  (3.05)  (0.76)  (0.47)  (1.66) 
Coast rural region  0.070**  -0.011  -0.161***  0.036  -0.014  -0.071* 
  (2.24)  (0.29)  (4.51)  (1.00)  (1.03)  (1.85) 
Central urban region  0.109**  -0.230***  -0.082  -0.125**  -0.009  -0.055 
  (2.47)  (4.39)  (1.63)  (2.55)  (0.46)  (1.05) 
Central rural region  0.016  -0.169***  0.154***  -0.088***  0.022*  -0.001 
  (0.50)  (4.52)  (4.26)  (2.81)  (1.85)  (0.04) 
Mountain urban region  0.173***  -0.245***  -0.151**  -0.105  -0.016  -0.068 
  (2.72)  (3.23)  (2.06)  (1.44)  (0.59)  (0.87) 
More than 1 man in the hh        0.201***  -0.014  0.031 
        (7.20)  (1.29)  (1.04) 
Migration density at municipality level in 1995    0.423***  0.069  1.400*** 
        (3.48)  (1.46)  (10.71) 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990       0.01  0.044***  -0.006 
        (0.31)  (3.58)  (0.18) 
Constant  -0.035  0.287  0.055  0.847***  0.023  -0.009 
  (0.23)  (1.56)  (0.31)  (8.95)  (0.63)  (0.09) 
Observations  2823  2823  2823  2823  2823  2823 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A4.  Labor market outcomes by gender: IV results - MALE 
  Dependent varianle  First stage 
  Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Current  Past hh  Past indiv.  
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  hh migr.  migr.  migr. 
Current hh migrants  -0.228  0.214  -0.031       
  (1.03)  (0.90)  (0.17)       
Past hh migrants  -0.071  -0.964  0.499       
  (0.09)  (1.13)  (0.77)       
Past indiv. migration  0.005  0.048  -0.027       
   (0.03)  (0.27)  (0.20)       
Married  0.068  0.005  -0.022  -0.034  0.132***  -0.024 
  (1.44)  (0.11)  (0.56)  (1.23)  (4.43)  (1.16) 
Age  0.014  -0.015  0.003  -0.021***  0.047***  -0.039*** 
  (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.10)  (4.72)  (9.61)  (11.62) 
Age squared  0  0  0  0.000***  -0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.35)  (0.50)  (0.13)  (6.21)  (12.23)  (13.40) 
N. of adults in hh  -0.014  0.037  -0.015  -0.015***  -0.015***  0.039*** 
  (0.41)  (0.99)  (0.52)  (3.14)  (3.03)  (11.13) 
N. of children 0-4  -0.016  0.051  -0.02  -0.023**  0.028**  0.035*** 
  (0.54)  (1.56)  (0.81)  (2.07)  (2.34)  (4.29) 
N. of children 5-10  -0.039**  0.016  0.025*  -0.051***  -0.039***  0.002 
  (2.17)  (0.80)  (1.66)  (5.07)  (3.61)  (0.24) 
N. of male children 11-14  -0.016  -0.001  0.008  -0.107***  -0.026  0.003 
  (0.53)  (0.04)  (0.32)  (6.99)  (1.59)  (0.24) 
N. of female children11-14  0.013  -0.047*  -0.003  -0.070***  -0.045***  -0.006 
  (0.58)  (1.93)  (0.14)  (4.84)  (2.89)  (0.57) 
Education (years)  0.026***  -0.009**  -0.011***  -0.009***  -0.003  0 
  (7.34)  (2.45)  (3.66)  (3.59)  (0.99)  (0.15) 
Chronic ill in hh  0.021  -0.035  0.024  0.066***  0.02  -0.014 
  (0.72)  (1.13)  (1.00)  (4.79)  (1.38)  (1.37) 
Asset position:             
Car ownership  -0.133***  0.151***  0.004  0.044**  0.034*  0 
  (5.08)  (5.30)  (0.19)  (2.25)  (1.65)  (0.02) 
Water inside dwellling  0.047**  0.065***  -0.096***  0.028*  0.066***  0.025** 
  (2.03)  (2.59)  (5.01)  (1.69)  (3.69)  (2.05) 
House fixed phone line  0.052  -0.055  0.012  0.003  0.019  -0.031** 
  (1.47)  (1.44)  (0.41)  (0.14)  (0.89)  (2.04) 
Land owned (ha.)  -0.056**  0.015  0.165***  0.059***  0.080***  0.023 
  (2.17)  (0.52)  (7.75)  (3.08)  (3.88)  (1.63) 
Land owned squared (ha.)  0.01  -0.002  -0.026***  0.001  -0.018***  -0.007** 
  (1.51)  (0.21)  (4.68)  (0.16)  (3.63)  (2.14) 
Regional controls:             
District unempl.rate 2002  -0.001  -0.003  0.002  0.005***  -0.003***  0 
  (0.57)  (1.55)  (1.44)  (4.65)  (2.72)  (0.20) 
Community has garbage coll.  0.130***  -0.001  -0.083***  0  -0.037  -0.011 
  (4.46)  (0.02)  (3.42)  (0.01)  (1.41)  (0.60) 
Community has police station  -0.017  0.029  0.018  0.037*  0.009  0.003 
  (0.64)  (1.00)  (0.80)  (1.66)  (0.40)  (0.21) 
Tirana  0.133***  -0.151***  -0.026  -0.04  -0.132***  -0.018 
  (2.81)  (2.95)  (0.67)  (1.00)  (3.10)  (0.61) 
Coast urban region  0.084*  -0.105**  -0.009  0.063  -0.033  -0.006 
  (1.73)  (1.99)  (0.21)  (1.58)  (0.76)  (0.21) 
Coast rural region  0.048  -0.001  -0.027  0.017  -0.013  -0.029 
  (1.17)  (0.02)  (0.78)  (0.58)  (0.40)  (1.33) 
Central urban region  -0.062  -0.05  -0.032  -0.067  -0.049  0.004 
  (1.24)  (0.91)  (0.76)  (1.64)  (1.12)  (0.12) 
Central rural region  0.070**  -0.069*  0.092***  -0.052**  0.012  0.012 
  (2.05)  (1.87)  (3.28)  (2.07)  (0.45)  (0.67) 
Mountain urban region  -0.053  -0.041  -0.06  -0.068  -0.085  0.048 
  (0.60)  (0.43)  (0.83)  (1.15)  (1.35)  (1.09) 
More than 1 man in the hh        0.166***  -0.015  0.018 
        (5.92)  (0.51)  (0.86) 
Migration density at municipality level in 1995    0.329***  1.298***  0.285*** 
        (3.16)  (11.64)  (3.69) 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990       0.011  0.081***  -0.023 
        (0.44)  (2.90)  (1.17) 
Constant  -0.119  0.36  0.286  0.441***  -0.379***  0.550*** 
  (0.26)  (0.72)  (0.74)  (5.10)  (4.09)  (8.59) 
Observations  3698  3698  3698  3698  3698  3698 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A5.  (Log) Weekly hours worked by gender: IV results - FEMALE   
  Dependent varianle  First stage 
  Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Current  Past hh  Past indiv.  
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  hh migr.  migr.  migr. 
Current hh migrants  -0.752  -0.908  1.101**       
  (1.54)  (1.58)  (2.03)       
Past hh migrants  -0.264  1.415***  -0.881**       
  (0.75)  (3.40)  (2.24)       
Past indiv. migration  2.179  -4.092  0.307       
   (0.97)  (1.56)  (0.12)       
Married  -0.162  -0.259**  0.297***  -0.042  0.024**  0.138*** 
  (1.57)  (2.13)  (2.59)  (1.56)  (2.27)  (4.72) 
Age  -0.014  0.017  0.105***  -0.041***  0  0.002 
  (0.50)  (0.52)  (3.49)  (7.71)  (0.14)  (0.42) 
Age squared  0  0  -0.001***  0.001***  0  0 
  (1.09)  (0.17)  (3.15)  (8.40)  (0.59)  (1.17) 
N. of adults in hh  0.009  -0.130***  0.054  -0.023***  -0.004*  0.051*** 
  (0.26)  (3.22)  (1.43)  (3.91)  (1.96)  (8.09) 
N. of children 0-4  -0.093  -0.195***  0.039  -0.040***  0.002  0.075*** 
  (1.61)  (2.88)  (0.60)  (2.88)  (0.40)  (5.01) 
N. of children 5-10  -0.119***  -0.024  0.141***  -0.067***  -0.002  -0.014 
  (2.59)  (0.44)  (2.75)  (5.89)  (0.48)  (1.12) 
N. of male children 11-14  -0.056  -0.095  0.075  -0.102***  -0.011  -0.01 
  (0.73)  (1.05)  (0.87)  (5.63)  (1.55)  (0.50) 
N. of female children11-14  -0.076  -0.052  -0.025  -0.043**  -0.004  -0.032* 
  (1.33)  (0.77)  (0.39)  (2.55)  (0.60)  (1.77) 
Education (years)  0.134***  -0.012  -0.044***  -0.005*  0.001  -0.001 
  (12.45)  (0.96)  (3.67)  (1.64)  (0.80)  (0.17) 
Chronic ill in hh  -0.031  0.101  0.006  0.065***  0.009  -0.015 
  (0.45)  (1.25)  (0.07)  (3.99)  (1.36)  (0.83) 
Asset position:           
Car ownership  -0.251***  0.253***  -0.016  0.035  0.009  0.048* 
  (3.06)  (2.61)  (0.18)  (1.43)  (0.98)  (1.86) 
Water inside dwellling  0.101  0.288***  -0.544***  0.019  0.020**  0.058** 
  (1.28)  (3.10)  (6.21)  (0.91)  (2.54)  (2.56) 
House fixed phone line  0.387***  0.139  -0.201*  0.053**  0.007  -0.079*** 
  (3.95)  (1.21)  (1.85)  (2.12)  (0.70)  (2.94) 
Land owned (ha.)  -0.358***  -0.012  0.889***  0.069***  0.022**  0.068*** 
  (3.94)  (0.11)  (8.82)  (3.05)  (2.47)  (2.80) 
Land owned squared (ha.)  0.050***  0.001  -0.115***  -0.008  -0.002  -0.017*** 
  (2.72)  (0.04)  (5.59)  (1.38)  (0.73)  (2.80) 
Regional controls:           
District unempl.rate 2002  -0.010**  0.001  -0.002  0.006***  -0.001  -0.001 
  (2.23)  (0.10)  (0.46)  (5.03)  (1.31)  (0.79) 
Community has garbage coll.  -0.007  0.023  -0.428***  -0.044  0.015  -0.006 
  (0.07)  (0.21)  (3.96)  (1.50)  (1.29)  (0.18) 
Community has police station  -0.038  0.146  -0.054  0.051*  0.012  -0.011 
  (0.38)  (1.26)  (0.49)  (1.87)  (1.14)  (0.38) 
Tirana  0.842***  -0.726***  -0.496***  -0.064  -0.005  -0.137*** 
  (5.29)  (3.88)  (2.80)  (1.30)  (0.29)  (2.59) 
Coast urban region  0.637***  -0.480**  -0.484***  0.037  0.009  -0.086* 
  (3.97)  (2.54)  (2.71)  (0.76)  (0.47)  (1.66) 
Coast rural region  0.261**  -0.055  -0.503***  0.036  -0.014  -0.071* 
  (2.25)  (0.40)  (3.89)  (1.00)  (1.03)  (1.85) 
Central urban region  0.418**  -0.862***  -0.303*  -0.125**  -0.009  -0.055 
  (2.54)  (4.46)  (1.66)  (2.55)  (0.46)  (1.05) 
Central rural region  0.064  -0.635***  0.538***  -0.088***  0.022*  -0.001 
  (0.54)  (4.62)  (4.14)  (2.81)  (1.85)  (0.04) 
Mountain urban region  0.638***  -0.909***  -0.486*  -0.105  -0.016  -0.068 
Instruments:             
  (2.69)  (3.26)  (1.84)  (1.44)  (0.59)  (0.87) 
More than 1 man in the hh    0.201***  -0.014  0.031 
        (7.20)  (1.29)  (1.04) 
Migration density at municip. in 1995  0.423***  0.069  1.400*** 
        (3.48)  (1.46)  (10.71) 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990     0.01  0.044***  -0.006 
        (0.31)  (3.58)  (0.18) 
Constant  -0.1  0.96  -0.264  0.847***  0.023  -0.009 
  (0.17)  (1.42)  (0.41)  (8.95)  (0.63)  (0.09) 
Observations  2823  2823  2823  2823  2823  2823 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A6: (Log) Weekly hours worked by gender: IV results - MALE 
  Dependent varianle  First stage 
  Wage  Paid  Unpaid   Current  Past hh  Past indiv.  
  Empl.  Self-empl.  work  hh migr.  migr.  migr. 
Current hh migrants  -0.922  0.721  -0.193       
  (1.08)  (0.80)  (0.25)       
Past hh migrants  -0.391  -3.445  3.038       
  (0.13)  (1.07)  (1.12)       
Past indiv. migration  0.072  0.175  -0.322       
   (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.58)       
Married  0.255  0.016  -0.017  -0.034  0.132***  -0.024 
  (1.39)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (1.23)  (4.43)  (1.16) 
Age  0.049  -0.044  0.08  -0.021***  0.047***  -0.039*** 
  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.65)  (4.72)  (9.61)  (11.62) 
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.000***  -0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.29)  (0.43)  (0.66)  (6.21)  (12.23)  (13.40) 
N. of adults in hh  -0.047  0.133  -0.107  -0.015***  -0.015***  0.039*** 
  (0.35)  (0.95)  (0.90)  (3.14)  (3.03)  (11.13) 
N. of children 0-4  -0.055  0.188  -0.104  -0.023**  0.028**  0.035*** 
  (0.47)  (1.53)  (1.01)  (2.07)  (2.34)  (4.29) 
N. of children 5-10  -0.144**  0.057  0.072  -0.051***  -0.039***  0.002 
  (2.05)  (0.77)  (1.14)  (5.07)  (3.61)  (0.24) 
N. of male children 11-14  -0.062  -0.019  0.005  -0.107***  -0.026  0.003 
  (0.54)  (0.16)  (0.05)  (6.99)  (1.59)  (0.24) 
N. of female children11-14  0.053  -0.195**  -0.017  -0.070***  -0.045***  -0.006 
  (0.61)  (2.11)  (0.22)  (4.84)  (2.89)  (0.57) 
Education (years)  0.096***  -0.035**  -0.043***  -0.009***  -0.003  0 
  (7.04)  (2.47)  (3.51)  (3.59)  (0.99)  (0.15) 
Chronic ill in hh  0.078  -0.136  0.1  0.066***  0.02  -0.014 
  (0.70)  (1.16)  (1.00)  (4.79)  (1.38)  (1.37) 
Asset position:             
Car ownership  -0.505***  0.634***  0.049  0.044**  0.034*  0 
  (4.99)  (5.94)  (0.54)  (2.25)  (1.65)  (0.02) 
Water inside dwellling  0.182**  0.243***  -0.369***  0.028*  0.066***  0.025** 
  (2.05)  (2.60)  (4.66)  (1.69)  (3.69)  (2.05) 
House fixed phone line  0.216  -0.203  0.083  0.003  0.019  -0.031** 
  (1.57)  (1.40)  (0.68)  (0.14)  (0.89)  (2.04) 
Land owned (ha.)  -0.204**  0.044  0.634***  0.059***  0.080***  0.023 
  (2.06)  (0.42)  (7.16)  (3.08)  (3.88)  (1.63) 
Land owned squared (ha.)  0.038  0  -0.094***  0.001  -0.018***  -0.007** 
  (1.44)  (0.01)  (4.03)  (0.16)  (3.63)  (2.14) 
Regional controls:             
District unempl.rate 2002  -0.003  -0.01  0.007  0.005***  -0.003***  0 
  (0.50)  (1.51)  (1.27)  (4.65)  (2.72)  (0.20) 
Community has garbage coll.  0.517***  0.008  -0.265***  0  -0.037  -0.011 
  (4.60)  (0.06)  (2.65)  (0.01)  (1.41)  (0.60) 
Community has police station  -0.079  0.118  0.058  0.037*  0.009  0.003 
  (0.77)  (1.09)  (0.63)  (1.66)  (0.40)  (0.21) 
Tirana  0.530***  -0.569***  -0.098  -0.04  -0.132***  -0.018 
  (2.91)  (2.96)  (0.60)  (1.00)  (3.10)  (0.61) 
Coast urban region  0.317*  -0.370*  -0.022  0.063  -0.033  -0.006 
  (1.69)  (1.87)  (0.13)  (1.58)  (0.76)  (0.21) 
Coast rural region  0.185  0.026  -0.033  0.017  -0.013  -0.029 
  (1.16)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (0.58)  (0.40)  (1.33) 
Central urban region  -0.246  -0.191  -0.148  -0.067  -0.049  0.004 
  (1.27)  (0.93)  (0.85)  (1.64)  (1.12)  (0.12) 
Central rural region  0.285**  -0.250*  0.315***  -0.052**  0.012  0.012 
  (2.17)  (1.81)  (2.69)  (2.07)  (0.45)  (0.67) 
Mountain urban region  -0.235  -0.166  -0.294  -0.068  -0.085  0.048 
  (0.70)  (0.47)  (0.98)  (1.15)  (1.35)  (1.09) 
Instruments:             
More than 1 man in the hh        0.166***  -0.015  0.018 
        (5.92)  (0.51)  (0.86) 
Migration density at municip. in 1995    0.329***  1.298***  0.285*** 
        (3.16)  (11.64)  (3.69) 
Family/friends living abroad in 1990       0.011  0.081***  -0.023 
        (0.44)  (2.90)  (1.17) 
Constant  -0.364  1.192  0.095  0.441***  -0.379***  0.550*** 
  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.06)  (5.10)  (4.09)  (8.59) 
Observations  3698  3698  3698  3698  3698  3698 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   34 
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